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Abstract
Deep neural networks have presented impressive perfor-
mance in biometric applications. However, their perfor-
mance is highly at risk when facing carefully crafted input
samples known as adversarial examples. In this paper, we
present three defense strategies to detect adversarial iris ex-
amples. These defense strategies are based on wavelet do-
main denoising of the input examples by investigating each
wavelet sub-band and removing the sub-bands that are most
affected by the adversary. The first proposed defense strat-
egy reconstructs multiple denoised versions of the input ex-
ample through manipulating the mid- and high-frequency
components of the wavelet domain representation of the in-
put example and makes a decision upon the classification
result of the majority of the denoised examples. The second
and third proposed defense strategies aim to denoise each
wavelet domain sub-band and determine the sub-bands that
are most likely affected by the adversary using the recon-
struction error computed for each sub-band. We test the
performance of the proposed defense strategies against sev-
eral attack scenarios and compare the results with five state
of the art defense strategies.
1. Introduction
Adversarial examples [17] are data samples modified to
fool machine learning classifiers. However, these modifi-
cations can be constructed to be perceptually indistinguish-
able for human observers [17, 6]. Therefore, the adversary
can utilize these samples to conceal the identity of a sub-
ject. In addition, these examples can be deployed to fool
a security system and provide access to unauthorized sub-
jects by matching the adversarial examples to a specific or
any other authorized subject. Adversarial examples are con-
sidered security threats since examples that are designed to
be misclassified by one machine learning model can also
be misclassified by other models [5]. Therefore, adversar-
ial examples can be generated without the exact knowledge
of the recognition framework. The countermeasures against
adversarial attacks, which are donated as defense strategies,
aim to either make the classifiers more robust to the adver-
sarial attacks or detect the adversarial examples.
There exist a very large variability of iris patterns among
different persons due to the chaotic morphogenesis involved
in the formation of the iris pattern [9]. Additionally, al-
though externally visible, the iris is relatively stable over
the time as a well-protected internal organ. As the result,
among different biometric traits, iris images are the most
reliable human identification trait. However, the adversarial
examples to fool the iris recognition systems can be a ma-
jor threat to the security systems, since many recognition
and security applications widely rely on iris recognition sys-
tems. In this paper, we propose three defense strategies that
are optimized to detect adversarial iris examples. To this
end, we benefit from the fact that the low and low-mid fre-
quencies wavelet components of an iris, consists of rich in-
formation for iris recognition and are robust to noises [14].
In addition, the adversarial attacks manipulate the classifiers
by adding high-frequency components to the input sample
and using an Lp norm constraint to control the amount of
the distortion.
In the first defense strategy, we focus on creating several
denoised versions of the input image example, where each
denoised version is constructed by setting some randomly
chosen mid- and high-level wavelet sub-bands to zero, and
classify each of them using the classifier used for the un-
perturbed benign examples. The second defense strategy
considers removing the sub-bands that are most likely per-
turbed by the adversary. In this strategy, each sub-band of
the input image example is denoised and the sub-bands that
change the most after denoising are ignored in the recon-
struction of the denoised version of the input image exam-
ple. The third strategy removes the sub-bands that are most
likely affected by the adversary and replaces the other sub-
bands with their corresponding denoised version.
In our proposed frameworks we benefit from the fact that
the wavelet decomposition divides the iris image into sub-
bands that represent different vertical, horizontal, and di-
agonal frequency ranges. The low and low-mid frequency
wavelet components of the iris are mainly used for iris
recognition. These components, that are robust to noise,
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Figure 1: In the first proposed defense strategy, the normalized iris image is considered as the input image example. K de-
noised version of this example are generated through randomly selecting a maximum number of N mid- and high-frequency
wavelet sub-bands of the example and setting them to zero. Each denoised example is classified by classifier, C. The majority
voting between classes assigned to the reconstructed examples by the classifier, cr is compared to the class assigned to the
input image example, c0, to decide whether or not the input image example is an adversarial example.
cannot be damaged drastically by the adversary to generate
adversarial examples. In this paper, we make the follow-
ing contributions: i) we introduce three defense strategies to
recognize the adversarial iris images, ii) each of these strate-
gies, that can be used as a preprocessing step in iris recogni-
tion frameworks, decompose the iris image into wavelet do-
main sub-bands, iii) the first strategy, randomly set some of
the mid- and high-level sub-bands to zero, reconstruct sev-
eral denoised versions of the input sample, and decide about
the input example by classifying the denoised examples,
iv) the second and third proposed strategies denoise each
wavelet domain sub-band and determines the sub-bands af-
fected by the adversary by investigating how much the sub-
bands changes after denoising, and v) the proposed frame-
work is robust to adversarial attacks and its performance is
compared to several defense strategies.
2. Related Works
2.1. Adversarial Attacks
Deep learning models have outperformed the classical
machine learning models in a variety of applications, such
as biometrics [30, 31, 29], security [40, 36], and hash-
ing [38, 37, 39]. However, deep learning models are vul-
nerable to carefully crafted small perturbations in the input
image. Although these small perturbations can change the
predictions of the model, human observers cannot notice
them. In other words, adversarial attacks [17] aim to con-
struct adversarial samples that can fool the classifier, while
perceptually very similar to the benign samples [17, 6]. The
adversary can utilize these samples to conceal the identity
of a subject and acquire access to a biometric security sys-
tem. One of the first adversarial attacks is generated by the
authors in [34] considering a L-BFGS method. Although
this method is able to fool deep classifiers trained on differ-
ent inputs, it is computationally expensive [8].
The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [11] is pro-
posed to compensate this shortcoming. The perturbation
in FGSM is calculated based on the sign of the gradient
of the classification loss with respect to the input sample.
The authors in [26] have increased the effectiveness of their
attack by using the gradient value instead of the gradient
sign. To reduce the computational cost of the attack, the
authors in [22] utilized a Jacobian matrix of the prediction
of classes with respect to the input pixels. They have re-
duced the number of pixels that are required to be altered
during the attack by calculating the saliency map of the in-
put space. However, saliency-based methods are computa-
tionally expensive due to the greedy search for finding the
most significant areas in the input sample. DeepFool [21]
finds Lp minimal perturbations by iteratively translating in-
put samples toward the closest decision boundary.
2.2. Adversarial Defense Strategies
Defense strategies against adversarial examples can be
categorized into two main categories [42]. Reactive strate-
gies try to detect adversarial examples after deep neural
networks are built. On the other hand, proactive strategies
make deep neural networks more robust before adversaries
generate adversarial examples. Network distillation, adver-
sarial training, and classifier robustifying are three major
proactive defense methods. The authors in [23] have con-
sidered distillation of the deep neural network [3] to defend
against adversarial examples. This approach is based on
the fact that adversarial attacks on deep neural networks are
successful because of the sensitivity of the deep networks.
Therefore, reducing the sensitivity of the model using distil-
lation, decreases the possibility of adversarial attacks. Au-
thors in [11] have included adversarial examples in their
training phase. Although, this strategy increases the robust-
ness of neural networks for one-step attacks but is not useful
to avoid iterative attacks [17]. Classifier robustifying aim
to decrease the uncertainty from adversarial examples, em-
ploying different classifiers models [4]. The authors in [2]
have observed that most adversarial examples are labeled
as a small subset of incorrect classes. Therefore, to mitigate
the misclassification effect of the adversarial examples, they
have divided the classes into sub-classes and ensembled the
result from sub-classes by majority voting.
Three major reactive strategies to prevent adversarial ex-
amples are adversarial detecting, input reconstruction, and
network verification. The authors in [10] have considered
training a binary classifier to detect the adversarial exam-
ples. The authors in [12] have added an outliers class to
their original classifier to detect the adversarial examples.
The authors in [32] have observed that the distribution of
the real data is different than the distribution of the adversar-
ial data. The authors in [20] have observed that the adver-
sarial examples have different low-ranked coefficients after
principal component analysis compared to the benign exam-
ples. Input reconstruction aims to transform the adversarial
examples to their corresponding benign examples, in order
for the adversarial examples to be classified into their cor-
rect classes. The authors in [20] have trained a denoising
auto-encoder network to transform adversarial examples to
benign examples by removing the adversarial perturbations.
Verifying the properties of deep neural networks is a reliable
defense strategy, since it can detect the new unseen attacks.
Network verification methods examine whether an input vi-
olates the properties of a neural network [13].
3. Proposed Method
In our proposed defense strategies, we do not alter the
classifier, but aim to detect adversarial examples by remov-
ing perturbations in the input examples. In other words,
the same classifier which is used for the unperturbed be-
nign examples is considered to detect the adversarial ex-
amples by classifying the denoised version of the input im-
age examples. To this aim, we decompose the input exam-
ple into its corresponding uniform wavelet sub-bands using
a uniform wavelet transform. Our first proposed defense
strategy, randomly sets some of the mid-high and high fre-
quency wavelet sub-bands to zero, and then reconstructs the
iris image. The reconstructed iris image is classified using
the classifier which is used for the benign iris images. This
process is repeated several times using the same classifier.
When the majority of the reconstructed iris images are clas-
sified as a different class compared to the class assigned to
the iris image, the iris image is considered as an adversarial
example. Since for each reconstructed iris image some of
the wavelet sub-bands are randomly chosen and set to zero,
the adversary cannot use this information to re-train their
adversarial network.
The second and third proposed defense strategies, inves-
tigate each wavelet domain sub-band and determine the sub-
bands that are most likely affected by the adversary. To this
end, we train a denoising auto-encoder for each wavelet do-
main sub-band on the training set. Then, for each test set
example we compute the sub-band specific reconstruction
errors for all the sub-bands. The sub-bands that change the
most after denoising are considered as the sub-bands that
are most affected by the adversary. In the second defense
strategy, these sub-bands are removed from the wavelet
domain representation of the input example before recon-
structing the denoised example. Similarly, the third strategy
removes the sub-bands that are most likely affected by the
adversary. However, it replaces the other sub-bands with
their corresponding denoised version, prior to reconstruc-
tion of the input example. If the classification result of the
denoised example is the same as the label assigned to the
input example, the input example is considered as benign.
3.1. Uniform Wavelet Decomposition
In contrast with hierarchical wavelet decomposition
which aims to decompose the low-pass sub-bands more
finely as the number of decomposition levels increases, uni-
form wavelet decomposition consists of decomposing an in-
put image uniformly into equal sub-bands. This uniform de-
composition provides our proposed framework with more
flexibility to choose mid- and high-frequency sub-bands.
There are 4L sub-bands in an L-level two-dimensional uni-
form wavelet decomposition. We denote these 4L sub-
bands by B(L) = {X(L)1 , X(L)2 , . . . , X(L)4L }, where X
(L)
1
represents the low-frequency component of the wavelet de-
composition. Assume that X is the input image example,
and g[n] and h[n] are the low-pass and high-pass analysis
wavelet filters, respectively. If X(L−1)i is the i
th sub-band
in (L − 1)-level uniform wavelet decomposition of the in-
put image example, X , its four corresponding level L sub-
bands after another level of uniform wavelet decomposition
are:
X
(L)
4i−3[n1, n2] = {X(L−1)i [n1, n2] ∗ g[n1] ∗ g[n2]}2 ↓V 2 ↓H ,
X
(L)
4i−2[n1, n2] = {X(L−1)i [n1, n2] ∗ h[n1] ∗ g[n2]}2 ↓V 2 ↓H ,
X
(L)
4i−1[n1, n2] = {X(L−1)i [n1, n2] ∗ g[n1] ∗ h[n2]}2 ↓V 2 ↓H ,
X
(L)
4i [n1, n2] = {X(L−1)i [n1, n2] ∗ h[n1] ∗ h[n2]}2 ↓V 2 ↓H ,
(1)
Figure 2: Training the denoising auto-encoders for the second and third proposed defense strategies. (a) These auto-encoders
are trained to reconstruct their corresponding wavelet sub-bands through the L2 reconstruction loss. (b) The trained auto-
encoders are utilized to compute the average reconstruction error for each sub-band on the validation set.
where n1 and n2 represent horizontal and vertical indexes,
respectively. X(0)1 = X , and 2 ↓V and 2 ↓H represent
down-sampling vertically and horizontally by a factor of 2,
respectively.
After denoising the input image example, X , in the
wavelet domain, the image X ′ is reconstructed from sub-
bands B′(L) = {X ′(L)1 , X ′(L)2 , . . . , X ′(L)4L }, where B′(L) is
the modified version of B(L). As described in Section 3.2,
this modification is done in order to denoise the input image.
Assume that g1[n] and h1[n] are the low-pass and high-pass
synthesis wavelet filters, respectively. Then,X ′(L−1)i which
is the ith sub-band in the (L− 1)-level uniform wavelet de-
composition of imageX ′, is reconstructed from its four cor-
responding wavelet sub-bands in L-level wavelet decompo-
sition:
X
′(L−1)
i [n1, n2] = {X ′(L)4i−3[n1, n2] ∗ g1[n1] ∗ g1[n2]}2 ↑V 2 ↑H
+{X ′(L)4i−2[n1, n2] ∗ h1[n1] ∗ g1[n2]}2 ↑V 2 ↑H
+{X ′(L)4i−1[n1, n2] ∗ g1[n1] ∗ h1[n2]}2 ↑V 2 ↑H
+{X ′(L)4i [n1, n2] ∗ h[n1] ∗ h[n2]}2 ↑V 2 ↑H ,
(2)
where X ′ = X(0)1 , 2 ↑V and 2 ↑H represent up-sampling
vertically and horizontally by a factor of 2, respectively.
3.2. Defense Strategies
The proposed defense strategies are effective for uni-
form wavelet decomposition and specifically iris images
since each wavelet sub-band roughly includes a different
range of vertical, horizontal, or diagonal frequencies. In
the first proposed defense strategy, as presented in Figure 1,
K denoised versions of the input iris image, X , are recon-
structed. We denote these reconstructed versions as X ′i, i =
1, 2, ...,K. To construct each denoised iris image, X ′i , we
decompose the input image example into its correspond-
ing uniform wavelet sub-bands, B(L) = {X(L)1 , X(L)2 , . . . ,
X
(L)
4L
}, using Equation 1. A maximum number of N high-
and mid-level sub-bands are randomly selected and repre-
sented by binary vector Wi ∈ R4L , where 0s in this vector
represent the sub-bands that should be set to zero and 1s rep-
resent sub-bands that we keep. This vector along with the
original wavelet sub-bands are used to construct sub-bands,
B
′(L)
i , representing the denoised version of the original in-
put iris image. Then, these sub-bands, B′(L)i , are utilized to
reconstruct the denoised iris image, X ′i , using Equation 2.
Each reconstructed input image example, X ′i , is classified
by the same classifier that is used for the unperturbed benign
iris examples. If the majority of theK reconstructed iris im-
ages are classified to the label assigned to the iris image, we
consider the iris image as a benign example. Otherwise, the
iris image is considered as an adversarial example.
The second and third proposed defense strategies focus
on removing the sub-bands that are perturbed the most by
the adversarial attack. To this aim, as shown in Figure 2,
we train a denoising auto-encoders for each sub-band us-
ing benign samples in the training set. Each auto-encoder,
AEi, which aims to reconstruct its corresponding sub-band,
is trained on the ith sub-band of the benign examples,X(L)i .
This auto-encoder reconstructs this sub-band as Xˆ(L)i . We
aim to minimize the difference between the input original
sub-band and the reconstructed sub-band using the follow-
ing loss function:
Lreci = ||Xˆ(L)i −X(L)i ||2. (3)
After training each auto-encoder, AEi, we compute the
average of the distance between sub-bands and the corre-
sponding reconstructed sub-bands for the benign examples
in the validation set as the sub-band specific average recon-
struction error:
Davgi = E{||Xˆ(L)i −X(L)i ||2}, (4)
Figure 3: Second and third proposed defense strategies: The trained auto-encoders are employed to denoise each wavelet
sub-band of the input image example. The distance between each sub-band and its corresponding denoised sub-band, along
with the average reconstruction error for each sub-band computed on the validation set, are considered to determine which
sub-bands should be ignored in order to denoise the input image example. The second strategy, considers keeping the other
sub-bands without any change, while the third strategy uses the denoised version of them in the reconstruction. The class
assigned to the reconstructed example by the classifier, cr, is compared to the class assigned to the input image example, c0,
to determine whether or not the input image example is an adversarial example.
where the expectation is calculated over the benign samples
in the verification set. These distances, are employed to
recognize the sub-bands that are removed or denoised when
reconstructing the input image example. As presented in
Figure 3, the trained auto-encoders are utilized to recon-
struct the denoised version of the input example, X , de-
noted by X ′. To this end, the input example is decomposed
into its corresponding sub-bands. Each sub-band is fed into
the corresponding denoising auto-encoder to be denoised.
The reconstruction error for each sub-band is calculated as:
Di = ||Xˆ(L)i −X(L)i ||2. (5)
These distances along with the average distances for the
sub-bands on the training set, Davgi are utilized to construct
the binary vector W :
αi =
Di
Davgi
, (6)
where the elements corresponding to the N largest α val-
ues are set to zero for generating the binary vector W . This
vector along with B(L) is utilized to construct B′(L) and
consequently X ′. If this image example is classified similar
to the input image example, X , the iris image is considered
as a benign example. Otherwise, it is considered as an ad-
versarial examples. The third defense strategy replaces the
sub-bands corresponding to the other 4L − N values with
their denoised version before reconstructing the input im-
age.
4. Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe the attack scenarios, the
dataset, and the optimization methods. We conclude the
section with reporting the results for the proposed frame-
works and comparing their performance with the state-of-
the-art frameworks.
4.1. Attack Scenarios
The majority of the iris identification frameworks con-
sider constructing iris-codes from the iris image [9, 35, 16,
19]. The iris-code is generally constructed through segmen-
tation, mask generation, normalization, and binerization.
We consider the normalized iris images as the image ex-
amples. In the conventional iris identifications frameworks,
the normalized iris image is converted to an iris template
through multiple levels of 2-D Gabor or wavelets filters. In
these frameworks, during the authentication or recognition
algorithm, iris-codes which are the constructed by binariz-
ing the iris templates are compared using bit-based metrics
such as Hamming distance.
However, conventional filter bank-based iris-code gener-
Figure 4: Iris code generation: The normalized iris image and the normalized mask are concatenated in depth as the input to
the iris code surrogate deep network.,The output is forced to mimic the iris code by minimizing the reconstruction loss. The
trained surrogate network is utilized to generate adversarial examples.
ation frameworks cannot be employed in our experimental
setup to generate adversarial examples since generating ad-
versarial examples requires back-propagation of the adver-
sarial loss. Therefore, to compensate for this shortcoming,
we train an auto-encoder surrogate network to mimic the
conventional iris code generation procedure. As presented
in Figure 4, the normalized iris image and the normalized
iris mask image, which are concatenated in depth, are fed to
this surrogate network to generate the iris code by minimiz-
ing the reconstruction loss. In this figure the template gen-
erated by the conventional iris verification algorithm is de-
noted by Ta and the iris template generated by the surrogate
network is denoted by Ts. The reconstruction loss is de-
fined as the L2 distance between these two templates [28].
The architecture for this surrogate network is presented in
Table 1.
The trained surrogate network, which follows the U-
net architecture [25], is then utilized to generate the ad-
versarial examples from the test set using the fast gradient
sign method algorithm (FGSM) [11], iterative gradient sign
method algorithm (iGSM) [17], and Deepfool [21]. The
step-size for iGSM algorithm is set 0.005. Following the
framework in [24], the normalized iris images for which the
Hamming distance between their iris-code and their corre-
sponding benign iris-code is more than 32% are considered
as adversarial examples. This assumption results in False
Match Rate of about 0.0001% [24]. We consider this crite-
ria as the termination criteria for the adversarial attacks.
4.2. Dataset and Optimization
In the experimental setup, the OSIRIS algorithm [16] is
considered to generate the normalized iris images, normal-
ized iris masks, and iris-codes. The normalized iris images
and normalized iris masks are of size 64× 512. OSIRIS al-
gorithm considers a filter bank of six Gabor filters to gener-
Table 1: Iris-code deep surrogate network: In this architec-
ture, which follows a U-Net architecture, the first five lay-
ers represent the encoding sub-network, while the next five
layers are the decoding layers. Conv and deconv represent
convolutional and deconvolutional layers, respectively.
layer kernel input output
conv1 4×4×64 64×512×2 32×256×64
conv2 4×4×128 32×256×64 16×128×128
conv3 4×4×256 16×128×128 8×64×256
conv4 4×4×512 8×64×256 4×32×512
conv5 4×4×512 4×32×512 2×16×512
deconv4 4×4×512 2×16×512 4×32×512
deconv3 4×4×256 4×32×(512 + 512) 8×64×256
deconv2 4×4×128 8×64×(256 + 256) 16×128×128
deconv1 4×4×64 16×128×(128 + 128) 32×256×64
deconv0 4×4×6 32×256×(64 + 64) 64×512×6
ate the binary iris-codes of size 384×512. Our classifier al-
gorithm utilizes the iris-codes generated by OSIRIS. In our
framework, ADAM solver for stochastic optimization [15]
is used to train the surrogate network and denoising auto-
encoders. All the optimizations are conducted using learn-
ing rate of 10−4. For the surrogate network and denoising
auto-encoders, the encoding and decoding sub-networks are
trained with 2×2 and 1×1 stride sizes, respectively. For the
surrogate network, the the encoding layers are concatenated
in depth with the corresponding layers in the decoding sub-
network. Separable kernels [33] are considered for all the
layers. The networks are trained using mini-batch of size
64. Batch normalization is applied on the outputs of all the
layers. A ReLU activation function is utilized for all the
layers except the deconv0 layer in the surrogate network,
Table 2: Denoising auto-encoder network architecture: The
first three layers represent the encoding sub-network, while
the next three layers are the decoding layers. Conv and
deconv represent convolutional and deconvolutional layers,
respectively.
layer kernel input output
conv1 4×4×64 16×128×1 8×64×64
conv2 4×4×128 8×64×64 4×32×128
conv3 4×4×256 4×32×128 2×16×256
deconv2 4×4×128 2×16×256 4×32×128
deconv1 4×4×64 4×32×128 8×64×64
deconv0 4×4×1 8×64×64 16×128×1
where tanh is considered. For the surrogate network, the
64×512×6 output is reshaped to 384× 512 to be compati-
ble to the iris-code.
Two dataset are considered in our experimental setup.
The iris-code surrogate network and denoising auto-
encoders, which are utilized in the second and third de-
fense strategies, are trained on 8, 000 normalized iris im-
ages from the BioCop dataset [1]. Denoising auto-encoders
are utilized using the verification set to compute average
reconstruction distance for the sub-bands. The details of
the denoising auto-encoder architecture are presented in Ta-
ble 2. The verification set consists of 2, 000 iris images
from the BioCop dataset. The test set is constructed us-
ing 3, 040 iris images from 231 subjects in the BIOMDATA
dataset [7]. One iris image from each subject is considered
as the gallery and the other samples are used as the probe.
The Hamming distance between the iris-codes correspond-
ing to the iris images in the gallery and prob are consid-
ered as our classification criteria. To make the experimental
setup unbiased, we consider the test set to include 50% be-
nign and 50% adversarial examples.
4.3. Experimental Results
We compare our proposed defense strategies with five
state-of-the-art frameworks. We consider the success rate
of recognizing the adversarial and benign examples as the
evaluation metric for defense strategies. Three adversarial
training frameworks [11, 41, 18] and two denoising frame-
works [20, 27] are considered as the baselines for the pro-
posed strategies. MagNet [20] considers using a denois-
ing auto-encoder and [27] denoises the input image exam-
ple using JPEG compression. For all our experiments, we
consider Haar wavelet and two levels of uniform wavelet
decomposition which results in 16 sub-bands.
In our first experimental setup, we focus on the first pro-
posed defense strategy. In this setup, we investigate how the
maximum number of sub-bands that are set to zero, N , and
the number of examples reconstructed, K, affect the suc-
cess rate. For this strategy, we consider that twelve mid-
and high-frequency sub-bands can be set to zero. As pre-
sented in Table 3, the performance of the proposed strategy
improves when the number of reconstructed examples in-
creases. On the other hand, when increasing the maximum
number of sub-bands that are set to zero, the performance
of this strategy drops after K equals to five sub-bands.
The second experimental setup investigates the perfor-
mance of the second and third defense strategies when the
number of sub-bands that are set to zero varies. As pre-
sented in Table 4, similar to the first strategy, the perfor-
mance first increases and then drops. As presented in these
two tables, both these strategies outperforms the first strat-
egy. This is due to the fact that randomly selecting and forc-
ing some of the sub-bands to zero, may destroy some useful
information as well as the sub-bands which are not affected
by the adversary. This may increase the false rejection rate.
However, when we select the bands affected by the adver-
sary based on the reconstruction error, we aim to keep the
information not destroyed by the adversary. Therefore, the
overall performance of the defense strategy improves. In
this table, we also present the average performance of the
classifier for no attack scenario. As expected, this perfor-
mance decreases when the number of sub-bands set to zero
is increased.
Table 5 presents the performance of five state of the art
defense frameworks on the test set. As presented in this
table, the adversarial training algorithms are outperformed
by the denoising frameworks. In addition, our proposed
defense strategies outperform both denoising algorithms.
This is due to the fact that instead of using a single auto-
encoder [20] or denoising the input image example through
compression [27], we aim to figure out which sub-bands
are most likely affected by the adversary. By defining the
sub-band specific distances, we customize the algorithm for
each input image example. In other words, the proposed
defense strategies do not denoise the input example blindly,
but specifically uses the sub-bands affected by the adversary
to denoise the input example.
5. Conclusions
We presented three defense strategies to detect the ad-
versarial iris examples. These strategies investigate each
wavelet sub-band in order to denoise the input examples.
Through defining these defense strategies, we remove the
sub-bands that are the most affected by the adversary. The
first proposed defense strategy reconstructs multiple de-
noised versions of the input example. Then, this strategy
decides about the input example through the classification
of the denoised examples. The second proposed defense
strategy denoises each wavelet domain sub-band. The sub-
bands that are most likely affected by the adversary are de-
Table 3: The performance of the first defense strategy for
the FGSM adversarial attack, when the maximum number
of sub-bands that are set to zero, N , and the number of ex-
amples reconstructed, K, are varied.
K, N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 12.50 20.87 22.21 26.67 32.38 28.21 26.31
5 22.13 24.54 31.92 40.48 45.58 40.67 35.56
7 24.79 26.91 35.72 43.21 56.37 51.90 44.75
10 26.87 28.73 38.64 54.91 62.75 59.12 49.43
15 28.31 30.84 42.83 64.43 64.81 64.37 54.57
20 31.10 35.51 62.75 72.97 75.01 65.89 65.23
30 32.14 46.87 63.81 72.41 76.08 66.08 65.46
Table 4: The performance of the second and third defense
strategies for three adversarial attacks when the number of
sub-bands that are set to zero, N , is varied.
Ours#2 Ours#3
N No Attack FGSM iGSM Deepfool FGSM iGSM Deepfool
1 99.10 12.57 8.31 18.35 12.91 10.42 18.54
2 98.97 15.19 12.67 25.48 15.24 14.86 25.92
3 98.86 27.38 20.72 37.53 28.51 23.12 37.73
4 98.54 38.52 32.15 63.74 39.54 35.28 64.11
5 98.21 61.74 55.43 84.36 62.12 57.74 84.36
6 98.07 81.23 75.59 78.21 81.65 77.59 78.25
7 97.87 78.18 71.81 70.42 78.53 73.81 70.51
Table 5: The performance of proposed defense strategies
compared to five state of the art algorithms. The first three
algorithms are adversarial training frameworks, while the
other two algorithms are denoising frameworks.
FGSM iGSM Deepfool
[11] 38.98 33.78 45.47
[41] 37.87 34.97 44.41
[18] 39.51 42.18 56.78
[27] 45.15 47.89 51.24
[20] 57.08 53.26 60.54
Ours#1 76.08 71.26 79.54
Ours#2 81.23 75.59 84.21
Ours#3 81.65 77.59 84.36
termined by the L2 distance between the wavelet domain
sub-bands and their reconstructed version. Finally, the third
proposed strategy, focuses on removing the sub-bands that
are most effected by the adversary, while reconstructing
the other sub-bands. We investigated the performance of
the proposed defense strategies using three attack scenar-
ios and compare the results with five state of the art de-
fense strategies. These five strategies include the adversar-
ial training and denoising frameworks. Our third proposed
defense strategy, which aims to customize the sub-bands re-
moved for each input example, outperforms the other two
proposed defense strategies.
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